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We also consider asymmetric effects that are
implied by models with menu costs (see, among
others, Ball and Romer, 1990, and Ball and Mankiw,
1994). In static (deterministic) settings, standard
menu-cost models imply that “big” monetary policy
shocks are neutral because firms would find it
optimal to adjust nominal prices, while “small”
monetary policy shocks would have real effects
because keeping nominal prices fixed is associated
with only a second-order cost. In other words, the
firms have to decide—before the monetary policy
shock is observed—whether to index their prices
(at the cost of paying the menu cost) or not. Firms
will choose indexation (which implies neutrality)
only if the variance of monetary policy shocks is
high. We extend the analysis by assuming that the
monetary policy process can change between hav-
ing a “high” variance and a “low” variance. This
approach allows for identifying periods of neutrality
and periods of non-neutrality. 
Finally, we consider the case in which only small
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T
his paper tests for the presence of asymmet-
ric effects of monetary policy on aggregate
activity using U.S. postwar quarterly data.
We are interested in three types of asymmetry: (i)
whether negative and positive monetary policy
shocks have different effects on output; (ii) whether
big or small shocks have different effects; and/or
(iii) whether low-variance, negative shocks have
asymmetric effects on output. We discuss the three
possibilities below and explain under which condi-
tions these asymmetries might take place.1
To date, the empirical literature has focused on
a particular asymmetry that we call “the traditional
Keynesian asymmetry,” which states that positive
monetary policy shocks have smaller real effects
than negative monetary policy shocks—or, in a more
extreme form, that only the latter shocks have real
effects. This asymmetry can be derived under the
assumption of either downward (upward) sticky
(flexible) nominal wages or sticky prices together
with rationing of demand.2,3
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2004      41
1 Other types of asymmetric effects have been explored by Garcia and
Schaller (1995), who examine whether monetary policy affects output
differently in different phases of the business cycle, and Ravn and Sola
(1997), who look at the effects of monetary policy on transitional
dynamics. Hooker and Knetter (1996) analyze whether military pro-
curement spending has asymmetric effects on employment, and they
find that “big” negative shocks to procurement have proportionally
larger effects on employment growth than large positive shocks or
small shocks to procurement. Hooker (1996) examines whether there
are asymmetries in the relationship between oil-price shocks and U.S.
macroeconomic variables. He finds that the asymmetric effects in this
relationship are fragile. Here we focus on the relationship between
monetary policy shocks and aggregate activity. Lo and Piger (2003)
examine regime switching in the response of U.S. output to monetary
policy. They find evidence of such time variance and show that policy
actions during recessions have larger output effects than policy actions
during expansions.
2 Cover (1992) and DeLong and Summers (1988) have tested for this
asymmetry in U.S. data: Cover (1992) finds firm support for the 
hypothesis in quarterly postwar data and shows that the results are
robust to the specification of monetary policy and output. DeLong
and Summers (1988) find that negative monetary policy shocks have
a greater output effect than positive ones. Karras (1996) analyzes data
for a number of European countries and finds strong evidence in favor
of the traditional Keynesian asymmetry hypothesis. Parker and
Rothman (2000) re-examine Cover’s (1992) evidence for the pre-
World War I and the interwar periods. They find that the type of
asymmetry documented by Cover existed only during the latter stage
of the Great Depression. Ravn and Sola (1996) show that, controlling
for a regime change in monetary policy in 1979, the asymmetry docu-
mented by Cover is no longer significant.
3 Kandil (2002) explores the asymmetric effects of government spending
and monetary shocks. Macklem, Paquet, and Phaneuf (1996) find
results for Canada and the United States in line with those quoted
above when including evidence from the yield curve and controlling
for foreign factors. Sensier (1996) finds less-firm support for the
asymmetry hypothesis in a study using U.K. data.
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negative shocks to nominal demand affect real
aggregate activity. Consider a dynamic menu-cost
model in which there is positive steady-state infla-
tion; firms can change prices costlessly every second
period, but, if firms want to change prices in between
the two periods, they must pay the menu cost. This
gives rise to an asymmetric pricing rule in which
“inaction” is optimal for a wider range of negative
shocks than positive shocks. We call this case the
“hybrid” asymmetry because it has similarities both
to the traditional Keynesian asymmetry and to the
menu-cost asymmetry. 
To test for the asymmetric effects described
above, we use a procedure that consists of estimating
a monetary policy process that allows for changes
in regime using the regime-switching model of
Hamilton (1988) appropriately modified to our set-
ting. We assume that the money supply is a regime-
switching process that allows for changes in the
mean and in the variance of the innovations to
the process. This implies that we can distinguish
between four different shocks to monetary policy:
big positive shocks, big negative shocks, small posi-
tive shocks, and small negative shocks. The distinc-
tion between “big” and “small” here refers to the
variance of the innovations in the two states. 
This technique allows us to test for the existence
of the three cases of asymmetric effects discussed
above. We estimate a simultaneous system consisting
of a monetary policy equation and an output equa-
tion, which includes the (change in the) current
unanticipated shocks from the “monetary policy”
relationship. We then test for asymmetries by intro-
ducing various parameter restrictions on the four
different types of unanticipated monetary policy
shocks in the output equation and by applying
likelihood ratio tests. 
We investigate two different sets of quarterly
data for the U.S. postwar period. First we examine
a data set for the period 1947-87, considered previ-
ously by Cover (1992), using M1 as the key monetary
variable. The second set of data is for the period
1960-95, previously examined by, among others,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996). Here
we measure monetary shocks on the basis of (the
negative of) the federal funds rate.4 The motivation
for using the federal funds rate rather than M1 (or
other money supply measures) is that the federal
funds rate is widely recognized to be one of the
primary monetary policy variables and is probably
a more stable measure of monetary policy than M1. 
Using the first set of data, we find that there have
indeed been regime changes in the money-supply
relationship. We find a low-growth, low-variance
regime that spans the period from 1947 to around
1967 and a high-mean, high-variance regime that
takes over for the majority of the period after 1968.
When we test for the presence of asymmetric effects,
we find that negative unanticipated money-supply
shocks have greater real effects than positive unan-
ticipated money-supply shocks. 
Using the federal funds rate as the measure of
monetary policy gives rise to different results. Again,
the monetary policy process is divided into two
regimes: one with a low mean and a low variance
and another with a high mean and a high variance.
The classification of the regimes is very different
when M1 is used. The low-mean, low-variance
regime occurs for most of the sample. The other
regime dominates for a short period in the mid-1970s
and the Volcker period. When we test for asymmetric
effects using these alternative data, we find strong
evidence in favor of the “hybrid asymmetry” (i.e.,
that only small negative monetary policy shocks
have real effects). This finding is in line with the
menu-cost model.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In the second section we look into the
implications for asymmetric effects of standard
menu-cost models. The third section is devoted to
a description of the empirical method that we will
apply. In the fourth section we examine the two
alternative sets of U.S. data and test for the presence
of asymmetries. In the fifth section we summarize
and draw some conclusions. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
First, to motivate and clarify the empirical
analysis, we consider some of the theoretical possi-
bilities for asymmetric effects of nominal demand
on real output. 
5 Since we wrote this paper, a number of authors have examined these
issues using slightly different techniques. Agénor (2001) examines the
evidence on asymmetries using a vector autoregression (VAR) technique.
He finds asymmetries for four emerging markets. Senda (2001) uses a
panel technique to examine whether the degree of asymmetry is related
to the magnitude of trend inflation and the variability of nominal gross
domestic product (GDP) growth. Weise (1999) also applies a VAR
technique focusing on asymmetries over the business cycle but also
finds asymmetries in the response to money shocks of different sizes.
4 We use the negative of the federal funds rate because a positive (nega-
tive) money-supply shock corresponds to a loosening (tightening) of
monetary policy.
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In the Keynesian literature building on sticky
wages or sticky prices, the natural candidate for
asymmetric effects is related to different real effects
of positive and negative changes in nominal demand.
Consider a model with downward (upward) sticky
(flexible) nominal wages. Assume that the labor mar-
ket initially clears at the nominal wage that corre-
sponds to the price level (and expected price level)
consistent with the current-level nominal demand
and that the long-run supply curve is vertical. This
implies that the supply curve will be vertical at the
expected price level but positively sloped for price
levels below the expected price level. Hence, unan-
ticipated increases in nominal demand will be
neutral, but unanticipated decreases in nominal
demand will be associated with lower output and
employment. 
The problem with the analysis above is the lack
of clear microeconomic foundations. Economic
agents may adjust to the economic environment,
and this can have implications for the result on
asymmetric effects. Hence, it is important to con-
sider models in which decision rules are explicitly
derived. We will consider whether such asymmetries
can arise in menu-cost-type models and derive the
specific types of non-linearities in the relationship
between activity and nominal demand.6
Here we follow the presentation in Ball and
Romer (1990) and Ball and Mankiw (1994). Consider
an economy with many price-setting agents, each
of whom acts as a producer/consumer. Each agent
produces a single differentiated good, which is sold
at the nominal price, Pi. It is assumed that there is
a small menu cost, denoted by s>0, of changing
nominal prices. Let the utility of agent i be given as
(1) ,
where Y denotes aggregate real spending, P is the
aggregate price level, and Di is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if prices are changed and 0 otherwise. We
assume that velocity is equal to unity, i.e., Y=M/P,
where M denotes the nominal money stock. Equa-
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In the absence of menu costs (s=0), the first-order
condition for each agent is that  , 
where G2 denotes the derivative of G with respect
to the second argument. In this case, in a symmet-
ric equilibrium, changes in M are neutral. Such a
symmetric equilibrium is assumed to exist and
corresponds to M=P=Pi=1.7 Consider now an
experiment where prices of all producers are set
according to an expected money supply equal to 1,
but after this M ≠ 1 is realized. Each producer decides
whether to pay the menu cost (setting prices equal
to Pi
*), in which case money is neutral, or maintain
prices (Pi), in which case money has real effects.
Assume, first, that every price-setter except i expects
all other price-setters not to change prices. The
utility of not changing the price for agent i is then
given as U
NA=G(M,1). If the agent decides to
change the price of good i, utility is given by U
CP=
G(M,Pi
*/P) – s. Hence, inaction is an equilibrium if 
(3) .
This condition implies that there is a range of
money supplies for which inaction is a possible
equilibrium.8 Making a second-order Taylor approxi-
mation around M=1, it can be shown that this range
is given when
(4)   M lies in the interval
.
The range of money-supply shocks for which
neutrality appears is given when




Thus, small money-supply changes have real
effects when M lies in the interval (1– M
*;1+M
*);
“big” changes are neutral when M lies in the interval
(–`;M
**) and/or (M
**;`). Hence, with menu costs
and no other features, it is the size of the change in





































7 Strictly speaking, one also needs to assume that the second-order
condition is fulfilled and that the equilibrium is stable (i.e., G22(1,1)<0
and G12(1,1)>0).
8 It is possible that this range overlaps with a range of money supplies
for which it is also optimal for all agents to change prices.
6 Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985), and Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987) have analyzed how menu-cost models (or near-rationality)
may affect the pricing decisions of firms and how this affects the
real effects of changes in nominal demand.
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Above, the changes in money supply are zero-
probability events. Alternatively, assume that money
supply is a stochastic process with a mean M and a
variance σ
2 and that agents must decide whether
to pay the menu cost before observing the current
money-supply shock. Thus, by construction, agents
choose either indexation or non-indexation. Ball
and Romer (1989, 1990) show that in this model
non-indexation is an equilibrium for 
(6) ,




between this case and the analysis above is that the
decision of whether to pay the menu cost is deter-
mined by the variance of the money-supply shock.
If the variance is high, money is neutral because
firms perceive that there is a high probability of a
big shock, while money has real effects if the vari-
ance is low. Thus, monetary policy is either always
neutral or always non-neutral. This is a rather nega-
tive result since the theory as such does not have
any testable (time-series) implications. 
This latter implication can be overturned by a
slight modification. Assume that the money supply
can switch between two states of nature. In state i




Let us also assume that the state variable that dic-
tates the variance of the money supply follows a
first-order Markov process. Let πij be the probability
that, given that the observed state today is i, the
realized state tomorrow is j. The probability transi-
tion matrix is given by 
(7) ,
where each row sums to 1. Assume also that agents
observe the current state when setting the initial
price and when deciding whether to pay the menu
cost or not. Then, using the same reasoning as above
shows that inaction is an equilibrium when 
(8)
when the current state is 0 and
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There are two possible outcomes here. If (i) the
difference between σ0
2 and σ1
2 is small or (ii) either
π01 or π10 is close to 1, there will be either indexation
or non-indexation in both states. If there is a non-
trivial difference between the two variances and
the states are relatively persistent, there will be
indexation if today’s state is 1 and non-indexation
if today’s state is 0. Hence, as in the standard menu-
cost model, firms’ actions depend on the monetary
policy that they observe and their expectations of
tomorrow’s monetary policy. 
Ball and Mankiw (1994) analyze a menu-cost
model in which firms face a two-period problem
and in which there is positive steady-state inflation
(equal to p ·). Each firm initially sets a price that can
be changed next period, subject to a menu cost. They
also assume the loss functions are quadratic such
that, for a big enough menu cost, firms will choose
a price that equals half the steady-state inflation rate
in both periods.9 If an unanticipated shock arrives
in period 1, it might be optimal for firms to pay the
menu cost and change prices. Since the optimal price
in period 1 (p ·) is already above the price set at
period 0 (p ·/2), it is clear that positive disturbances
will lead to a greater incentive to change prices than
negative disturbances. They show that in a quadratic
setup, the range of non-action is given when M lies 
in the interval , which is sym-
metric around –p ·/2 but asymmetric around 0. The
model therefore implies an asymmetry that is similar
to both the basic menu-cost results discussed above
and to the traditional Keynesian asymmetry. We call
this “hybrid” asymmetry.10
Finally, it is worth mentioning that imperfections
in the labor market such as the existence of effi-
ciency wage considerations or insider-outsider
phenomena can be coupled with the menu-cost
models. This has been investigated by Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) and Ball and Romer (1990), and the
−− − () sp sp ˙˙ 22 ;
9 If we let p · denote the steady-state inflation rate, then with a quadratic
loss function it is optimal to set prices at p ·/2 in both periods, given
that s>p ·2/2.
10 Senda (2001) shows that the degree of asymmetry depends on the
mean trend inflation rate and the variability of aggregate demand.
Senda finds that the degree of asymmetry is non-trivially related to
the mean inflation rate, increasing for low-to-moderate inflation rates
but decreasing for high inflation rates. The reason for this is that, as
inflation rates become very large, the cost of two-period price-setting
becomes very large (in expected terms) and firms thus realize that
they will probably want to change prices in the intermediate period.
In this case, the asymmetry may become very small, although it still
persists qualitatively. Senda also provides some favorable evidence
of this hypothesis based on a panel of prewar and postwar data.
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literature has shown that real rigidities increase the
importance of nominal rigidities. 
The cases discussed above relate to how different
monetary policy shocks affect output. An alternative
asymmetry is that monetary policy may affect aggre-
gate activity differently during booms compared
with recessions. Credit and liquidity may be readily
available in booms, and it is likely that monetary
shocks during these periods are neutral. In reces-
sions, however, firms and consumers may find it
harder to obtain funds and monetary policy might
have real effects through the credit and liquidity
channels. This is the mechanism examined in the
research on financial market imperfections (see, e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Gertler, 1992, Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1993, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).
Although this possible asymmetry is of great interest,
we shall not address it here but will concentrate on
the above versions of asymmetric effects. 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe our empirical
methodology, which is related to the procedure used
for testing the New Classical theories of information-
based non-neutralities (developed by Lucas, 1972,
1975) in Barro (1977, 1978), Barro and Hercowitz
(1980), Boschen and Grossman (1982), and, in partic-
ular, Mishkin (1982). Two relationships are estimated
simultaneously. The first of these is a monetary
policy relation from which one obtains estimates of
the anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy
shocks. These shocks then feed into an aggregate
output equation. DeLong and Summers (1988) and
Cover (1992) test whether positive and negative
unanticipated monetary policy shocks have different
effects on real activity and find strong support for
the traditional Keynesian asymmetry in U.S. data. 
Cover’s (1992) methodology can be summarized




where ∆ is the first-difference operator, mt is the
measure of the monetary policy, Φ(L) is a lag poly-
nomial, Θ is a vector of parameters, xt–1 is a vector
of predetermined regressors that reflects possible
endogenous policy responses (and includes variables
such as unemployment, changes in the monetary
base, changes in output, government budget sur-
pluses, changes in interest rates, and inflation), yt is
∆yz tt t t t =+ + +
++ −− ψβ ε β ε ξ
∆Φ ∆ Θ m Lm x tt t t =+ + −− () 11 ε
the measure of real aggregate activity, ψ is a param-
eter vector, ztis a vector of regressors (which includes
lagged changes in output and lagged changes in the
Treasury bill rate), and εt
+ and εt
– are the positive




Equation (9) is the monetary policy process and
equation (10) is the aggregate output equation. The
asymmetry hypothesis is a test of whether β
+ equals
β
–; rejection of this restriction, together with β
+
being insignificantly different from zero and β
–
significantly different from zero, supports the
hypothesis.11
We extend this methodology along two lines.
First, on the basis of the theory presented in the
previous paragraph, we impose that monetary
impulses have only temporary effects on the level
of output. Because the output series we use here
has a unit root, we stick to modeling the growth
rate of output; but we change the specification of
this equation12 to
(12) ,
where β is a vector of parameters and et is a vector
of unanticipated money shocks specified later in the
paper. This specification implies that any unantici-
pated shock associated with monetary policy will
increase output only temporarily, exactly as stated
in the theories that we have discussed. 
Second, we differentiate not only positive and
negative monetary policy shocks, but also big and
small shocks. As made clear above, in a stochastic
menu-cost model the relevant distinction between
big and small is based on the variance of the unantici-
pated monetary policy shock. Hence, we estimate a
monetary policy relationship that allows for this dis-
tinction, as a discrete-state regime-switching model.13
∆yz e e tt t t t =+ − + − ψβ ξ () 1
11 Note that according to the specification of the money-supply equation
and the output equation, money supply reacts to lagged variables,
while output reacts to current monetary shocks. This assumption is
contrary to standard assumptions made in the VAR literature but can
be justified on the basis that the monetary authority may not have
information on current output, while “true” real activity may be
affected by actual current changes in monetary policy. We make this
assumption mainly to make the analysis comparable to the previous
contributions on asymmetries.
12 We thank Paul D. Evans for pointing out the need to specify the system
to account for the latter point.
13 Such a technique has been used widely to characterize movements
that arise when the moments of the variables under scrutiny change
behavior over time; see, e.g., Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990), Phillips
(1991), Sola and Driffill (1994), and Ravn and Sola (1995). The basic
elements of the method are described extensively in Hamilton (1994).
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According to the regime-switching methodology,
a time series is modeled as having discrete changes
in its unconditional mean and/or variance and the
changes in regime are dictated by an unobservable
discrete-valued state variable, st=0,1. We also add
to the switching regression a set of conditioning
variables that are not subject to regime changes. With
this modification, we estimate a monetary policy
equation that allows for changes in mean and vari-
ance. This leads us to the following specification: 
(13)
,
where Φ(L) is a lag polynomial, Θ is a vector of
parameters, x′ t–1 is a vector of de-meaned predeter-
mined variables (we include as regressors the log
difference of non-borrowed reserves, the log differ-
ence of total reserves, the log difference of GDP, and
the log difference of the implicit GDP deflator)14
defined as x – µx, µ(st) is a state-dependent mean,
st is the discrete-valued state variable, and ηt is an
i.i.d. N(0,1) error term that is independent of st. 
The monetary policy process can have two
different means, µ0 and µ1, with associated variances
σ0
2 and σ1
2. In the practical application these are
estimated as µ0+∆µst and σ0+∆σst. It is assumed
that the (unobserved) states are generated by a two-
state Markov process. Let πij be defined as πij=
P(st=i|st–1=j), i,j=0,1. The probability transition
matrix is given as 
(14) ,
where each of the transition probabilities is restricted
to be non-negative and belongs to the unit interval.15
The division into big and small shocks is done
as follows. Consider the expected money growth in
period t, given information available at time t–1 and
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includes the realization of the states. Expected
money growth is given as 
if st=0 and
if st=1, where * denotes that the information set
includes the realized states. The unexpected mone-
tary policy shocks in these two cases can then be
defined as
.
The true information set, however, does not
include the realized state, so we need to draw an
inference on the regimes. To do this we use the
estimates of the probabilities of being in each of
the two regimes. Let P(st=i|It) be the (estimated)
probability conditional on information available at
time t that the state is equal to i at time t using the
(modified) Hamilton filter. Assume also that state 0
is the state in which the variance of unanticipated
monetary policy shocks is low. We can then define




Next, each of these two shocks can be divided
into their positive and negative parts, which we
denote by + (positive) and – (negative), using the
same technique as in the previous section. Accor-






























































































































































Em m x tt t t − −− =++ −+ () () + () 10 1 0 1 1 1
* ∆∆ Φ ∆ ∆ Θ µµ µµ π
Em m x tt t t − −− =+ −+ () () + () 10 1 0 0 1 1
* ∆Φ ∆ ∆ Θ µµ µ π
14 We de-mean the non-switching exogenous variables so that µ(st) can
be interpreted as the unconditional mean of money growth.
15 Note that we do not allow for regime switching in the exogenous
variables. To allow these variables to have changes in regime will
require imposing either that they all switch simultaneously with the
money supply (see, e.g., Sola and Driffill, 1994) or that each variable
is allowed to switch independently (see, e.g., Ravn and Sola, 1995).
The first approach is applicable when the variables are closely related
(for example, for interest rates of bonds of different maturities), but
does not naturally occur in the present analysis. The second approach
has the disadvantage that the increase in the number of states quickly
makes it intractable.
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to test for the presence of asymmetric effects using
the following procedure.16
We estimate jointly the monetary policy equa-
tion (13) and the following version of the output
equation17: 
(17)
First we estimate equations (13) and (17), impos-
ing that all the β coefficients are equal to 0—that is,
that money has no real effects. We call this Case 0.
Next, we estimate the system that allows the unan-
ticipated monetary policy shocks to enter unre-
stricted. We call this Case 1. At this point one can
look at the significance of each of the shocks as a
check on signs of asymmetric effects; one can also
check for monetary neutrality by using a likelihood-
ratio (LR) test (with four degrees of freedom) if it is
tested against Case 0. 
The tests for asymmetries are carried out in a
sequential manner using LR tests by imposing
parameter restrictions on the coefficients on ∆et.
First we impose the following: 
(18)  Case 2: .
Asking whether Case 2 is a valid simplification
of Case 1 is equivalent to testing for the absence of
any asymmetry and can be performed as an LR test
that is χ
2–distributed with three degrees of freedom
under the null. If these restrictions are rejected, the
tests for the two versions of asymmetric effects are
carried out by imposing a number of different
parameter restrictions. 
First, consider the case of testing for the asym-
metry hypothesis that positive and negative mone-
tary policy shocks have different effects; this can
be tested in two steps. According to this hypothesis,
it should not matter whether a given monetary
policy shock is big or small. Hence, we impose the
following: 
(19)  Case 3:  .
Comparing Case 3 with Case 1 constitutes the
first assessment of this hypothesis. It is further
required that positive shocks are neutral. Hence,
we impose the following: 
H
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(20)  Case 4: .
Comparing Case 4 with Case 3 is a way to assess
whether positive shocks are neutral. If these tests
are passed and the coefficient on the negative shocks
is significantly positive, the data support the tradi-
tional Keynesian asymmetry hypothesis. 
The other asymmetry hypothesis can be tested
similarly. First we impose the following: 
(21)  Case 5: .
Testing Case 5 against Case 1 constitutes the
first part of the hypothesis. The second part imposes
that big shocks are neutral: 
(22)  Case 6: .
Again, we test this specification against Case 5,
and if the test is passed the hypothesis is backed by
the data. A last case to consider is the hybrid version
in which only small negative shocks have real
effects. We can test the hybrid version in any of the
sequences outlined above. This can be performed
by imposing the following: 
(23)  Case 7: .
We test this against Case 1 because this case
might not be nested within Case 4 or Case 6 if the
null is correct.18
EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES
In this section, we empirically test for the differ-
ent varieties of asymmetric effects of nominal
demand on real activity discussed in the previous
section. We look at two alternative sets of quarterly
data for the United States.19 The first data set covers
the period 1948-87 and the second data set covers
the period 1960-95. 
In both applications we use the empirical
method described above, but the two applications







0 0 : and ββ ββ
+− +− == =
H
BB SS




0 0 : and ββ ββ
++ −− == =
18 The main difference between our approach and other applications is
the definition of big and small shocks. Demery (1993) makes the distinc-
tion by defining the former as those that are in a two-standard-error
interval around 0 and the latter as those not belonging to this interval
(i.e., as outliers). Caballero and Engel (1993) apply a similar strategy
when testing for asymmetries in the price adjustments of firms in the
face of nominal rigidities and changes in demand. This definition is
not appropriate in light of our analysis in the previous section and
may produce estimates of wrongly identified monetary policy shocks. 
19 The data are described in more detail in the appendix.
16 Alternatively, one can use a method of simulated moments to obtain
estimates of the unexpected money growth.
17 The models were estimated using a maximum-likelihood estimator
for the joint system of equations.
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For the first data set, we use the logarithm of M1 as
the measure of monetary policy. When looking at
the more recent data, we use the (negative of the)
federal funds rate. The procedure we use depends
on the time-series properties of the data in question,
since we need to forecast the monetary policy
process. Preliminary data analysis revealed that
the logarithm of the money supply has a unit root,
whereas the federal funds rate is a stationary
process. Given this, for the federal funds rate we
estimate equation (13) in levels using –r
fas the meas-
ure of ∆mt. For the money-stock measure, we use the
first difference of the logarithm to construct the one-
step-ahead forecast error. Let Mt be the money series
that has a unit root—then the one-step-ahead fore-
cast will be 
(24) ,
where Y ˆ(L) is an estimator of Y(L),
(25) .
This implies that the unanticipated money
shock can be written as
(26) .
Note that the theoretical relationships that we
want to consider are in “levels,” whereas the empiri-
cal model is in “differences”; therefore, we consider
relationships of the type expressed in equation (12)
to preserve the theoretical structure of interest: 
(27) .
Another issue to be addressed is the specification
of the relationships for monetary policy and output.
The money-supply process is specified as in Barro
and Rush (1980), as in Mishkin (1982), or as an
“optimal” money supply.20 The two specifications
of the output equation have in common that zt
includes a constant, lagged change in real output, εt
+
and εt
–; but the two specifications differ in whether
the change in the T-bill rate is included or not. 
In all of the above money-supply processes
there are signs (i) of misspecification related to the
∆yz e e tt t t t =+ − () + − ψβ ξ 1
eMM L M ttt t + + =− + () 11 ˆ Y() D
∆∆ ML M tt = () − ˆ Y 1
MML M t
e
tt + =+ 1 ˆ Y() ∆
existence of an outlier (at the first quarter of 1983,
when the Volcker regime ended) in the money-
supply residuals and (ii) of heteroskedasticity of the
money-supply residuals (details can be found in Ravn
and Sola, 1996). For these reasons, we estimate (using
a general-to-specific approach) an alternative money-
supply process that includes the first lag of M1
growth; the fourth- to the sixth-quarter lags of the
(log of the) federal government’s budget surplus; the
first, fifth, and sixth lags of the log difference of the
monetary base; the two-quarter lag of the unemploy-
ment rate; the second and the sixth lags of output
growth; and the first, third, and fifth lags of the first
difference of the T-bill rate.21,22 This relationship was
identified by testing downward from a relationship
that initially included six lags of all the variables. 
In the second application we use the negative
of the federal funds rate as the measure of monetary
policy. We use the negative of the federal funds rate
such that a positive shock to the monetary policy
process can be interpreted as a loosening of mone-
tary policy. In this application, the vector of regres-
sors in the monetary policy relationship includes
four lags of the (negative of the) federal funds rate,
four lags of the log difference of GDP, four lags of the
log difference of nonborrowed reserves, four lags
of the log difference of total reserves, and four lags
of the log difference of the implicit GDP deflator.23
For both sets of data we specified the output
equation (17) such that it includes one lag of output
growth, the first difference of the T-bill rate, and the
lag of the first-differenced T-bill rate. 
Results for M1
Single-Equation Estimates of the Money
Supply. We first turn to the results of single-equation
estimates of the money-supply process with
changes in regime. Figure 1 illustrates the first
difference of the log of M1, and Table 1 reports
21 It also turns out that, once one corrects for the presence of the outlier,
the results on asymmetric effects are no longer valid. Specifically, one
can in this case no longer reject a hypothesis that the positive and
negative shocks have the same effect on output and that they are
neutral. Details on results are given in Ravn and Sola (1996, Table 3).
22 Belongia (1996) documents another problem with the asymmetry
result for the U.S. data. Belongia (1996) shows that if one uses a divisia
index for the money stock, then one cannot reject the hypothesis that
positive and negative money-supply shocks have symmetric effects.
23 We also experimented with including the unemployment rate, but this
variable did not affect the results. It should also be noted that we have
not included the index of sensitive commodity prices that Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) introduce to address the “price puzzle.”
This issue is not important for our analysis.
20 In the Barro-Rush specification, the vector of regressors xt–1 includes
a constant, the unemployment rate, and the contemporaneous real
federal expenditures to normal expenditures. In the “modified Mishkin”
specification, xt–1 contains constant, lagged changes in money supply,
lagged changes in the T-bill rate, and lagged values of the federal govern-
ment’s budget surplus. The “optimal” specification includes various
elements of the above variables as well as lagged values of the changes
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the results for the estimation of the money-supply
process with changes in regime. We find that the
changes in both the mean and the variance of the
process are significant. The estimates suggest that
there is a low-mean, low-variance regime where the
mean is around 0.7 percent per quarter and the
standard deviation around 0.4 percent and a high-
mean, high-variance regime where the mean is
around 1.65 percent per quarter and the standard
deviation around 0.8. That is, the mean and standard
deviation of the innovation in the “high” state
(state 1) of money supply are roughly twice the
corresponding numbers in the “low” state (state 0).
Note also that both regimes are quite persistent,
since the diagonal elements of the transition matrix
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Figure 2 illustrates the estimated probabilities
of being in regime 1, the regime in which the mean
and the variance are both high. The filter divides the
sample very clearly into the two regimes, and the
estimates imply that money growth and the variance
of money growth were low from the start of the
sample until 1967. From 1967 to 1987:Q4, the proba-
bility of being in the regime with high mean and
high variance is practically equal to 1, with the
exception of the last three quarters of 1976 and the
final three observations. It should also be noted that
there are no signs of specification errors in the
regression residuals. 
Tests for Asymmetric Effects. We first esti-
mate Case 0, that is, the output equation, without
money entering into it. This is reported in the first
column of Table 2. We see that the output equation
is relatively well estimated, with no signs of mis-
specification in the errors. Next, we estimate the
system, letting each of the money-shock compo-
nents enter unrestricted (Case 1). None of the four
money-supply shocks are significant individually,
but the LR test implies that the four shocks are
significant jointly. There is no clear pattern that
leads one to suspect the presence of asymmetries,
but to test this more formally we use the procedure
outlined above. 
Money Supply with Changes in Regime: M1 Process, Single-Equation Results, 1948:Q1–1987:Q4
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate Test statistic
∆m1t–1 0.257 µ0 0.726 Q(1) = 0.295
(0.072) (0.131) [0.587]
ut–2 0.403 ∆µ 0.934 Q(10) = 9.521
(0.189) (0.235) [0.709]
fst–4 –1.160 σ0 0.417 QQ(1) = 2.264
(0.608) (0.041) [0.132]
fst–5 2.254 ∆σ 0.368 QQ(10) = 16.120
(0.843) (0.077) [0.096]
fst–6 –1.234 π00 0.985
(0.528) (0.015) 
















NOTE: ∆m1 is the log difference of M1; u is the unemployment rate; fs is the log of the federal government’s budget surplus; ∆b is the
log difference of the monetary base; ∆y is the log difference of GNP; and ∆tbr is the difference of the T-bill rate. Q(x) (QQ(x)) is the
Box-Pierce test for autocorrelation in the standardized residuals (squared standardized residuals) of order x. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors; numbers in brackets are probabilities.
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First we impose the restrictions based on Case
2, that is, absence of asymmetries. We obtain a p-
value of 6.94 percent for this hypothesis, implying
that there is no strong evidence in favor of asym-
metric effects once one allows all the coefficients
to enter unrestricted in the alternative hypothesis.
Notice also that, once these restrictions are imposed,
we obtain significant coefficients on the unantici-
pated shocks to M1. However, we still test for asym-
metries and first look at the traditional Keynesian
hypothesis; that is, we impose the restrictions of
Case 3. These restrictions imply that big and small
shocks enter with the same coefficients. The param-
eter estimates now imply that negative shocks enter
with a coefficient that is much larger than that of
positive shocks. Furthermore, the LR test indicates
that the restrictions cannot be rejected at any con-
ventional significance level (in spite of the coeffi-
cients being insignificant individually). 
When we impose that the positive shocks are
neutral, we find that the negative shocks become
significant; but, when tested against Case 3, the
Output Equation ML Estimates: M1 Measure, 1948:Q1–1987:Q4 
Variable Case 0 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
Constant 0.540 0.502 0.520 0.502 0.520 0.507 0.502 0.533
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098)
∆yt–1 0.329 0.370 0.353 0.369 0.355 0.371 0.376 0.337
(0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.055) (0.075) (0.075)
∆tbrt 0.272 0.278 0.284 0.278 0.277 0.285 0.285 0.272
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
∆tbrt–1 0.081 0.051 0.071 0.052 0.057 0.070 0.071 0.079
(0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
∆et
S+ — 0.071 0.184 0.025 — 0.395 0.448 —
(0.391) (0.083) (0.160) (0.219) (0.174)
∆et
S– — 0.370 0.184 0.415 0.363 0.395 0.448 0.335
(0.386) (0.083) (0.220) (0.166) (0.219) (0.174) (0.377)
∆et
B+ — 0.003 0.184 0.025 — 0.075 — —
(0.106) (0.083) (0.160) (0.178)
∆et
B– — 0.432 0.184 0.415 0.363 0.075 — —
(0.240) (0.083) (0.220) (0.166) (0.178)
σY 0.972 0.950 0.956 0.950 0.954 0.950 0.947 0.969
Q(1) 0.174 0.371 0.169 0.392 0.232 0.186 0.191 0.269
[0.677] [0.543] [0.680] [0.531] [0.630] [0.666] [0.662] [0.604]
Q(10) 8.474 7.652 7.957 8.050 8.408 7.487 8.997 9.518
[0.583] [0.663] [0.633] [0.624] [0.589] [0.679] [0.532] [0.484]
QQ(1) 2.165 4.964 3.166 4.991 4.312 3.441 2.982 2.932
[0.141] [0.026] [0.075] [0.026] [0.038] [0.064] [0.084] [0.087]
QQ(10) 7.306 12.575 9.958 12.427 11.246 11.114 10.867 8.264
[0.696] [0.248] [0.444] [0.258] [0.339] [0.349] [0.368] [0.603]









[0.018] [0.069] [0.983] [0.007] [0.040] [75.42] [0.011]
NOTE: See note to Table 1. The monetary shocks refer to unanticipated shocks. We do not report the estimates of the money-supply
equations (which are jointly estimated by ML), but they are available upon request. 0) LR test of Case 0 vs. Case 1; 1) LR test of Case 2
vs. Case 1; 2) LR test of Case 3 vs. Case 1; 3) LR test of Case 4 vs. Case 3; 4) LR test of Case 5 vs. Case 1; 5) LR test of Case 6 vs. Case 5;
6) LR test of Case 7 vs. Case 6.
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restrictions of Case 4 are strongly rejected. It should
be noted, however, that the positive shocks have
very small effects on output. Thus, even though we
formally reject that these shocks are neutral, their
quantitative effects appear limited. 
The other alternative to be tested is whether big
and small money-supply shocks have asymmetric
effects on output. First we impose the restrictions
under Case 5 (i.e., that it is irrelevant whether the
shocks are positive or negative). We find that the
probability value of the LR test of this hypothesis is
4 percent, which implies that we would reject the
null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. One might be
tempted to continue with the hypothesis, given the
marginal rejection. In that case one would not be able
to reject that big shocks are neutral, thus finding
evidence in favor of the menu-cost type of asym-
metry. However, the likelihood of Case 5 is much
worse than the competing likelihood of Case 3: Thus,
in this respect, Case 3 appears to be the better speci-
fication. Finally, we need to look at Case 7, the case
based on the hybrid asymmetry. This case is rejected
regardless of which alternative it is tested against. 
In conclusion, the data give some support to
the idea that negative monetary policy shocks have
larger real effects than positive monetary policy
shocks. However, at the same time, we cannot for-
mally reject that all types of shocks have identical
effects on output—that is, that monetary policy
has symmetric effects. And, regardless of this, we
find very small monetary policy effects. Thus, while
the evidence does not directly contradict previous
evidence, the results do not strongly support the
traditional Keynesian asymmetry. 
Results for the Federal Funds Rate
As discussed previously, there are reasons to
expect that the results above might be hampered
by the structural instability of M1 demand. It has
previously been shown that M1 demand has been
relatively unstable in the 1980s and the 1990s.
This implies that the shocks identified above, as a
“monetary policy” shock, may well indeed be a
mixture of money-demand and money-supply
shocks. (See, e.g., Baba, Hendry, and Starr, 1992, or
Stock and Watson, 1993, for a discussion.) It has also
been claimed that the federal funds rate may be a
better indicator of monetary policy.24 The reason is
that much of the Federal Reserve’s intervention
takes place in the form of changes in nonborrowed
reserves, which affect the interest rate in the reserve
market, that is, the federal funds rate. For these
reasons we now take up the question of asymmetric
effects using the federal funds rate rather than M1.
To facilitate an easy comparison with the analysis
for M1, we will transform the federal funds rate and
measure it by the negative of the federal funds rate
such that positive shocks indicate a loosening of
monetary policy. The federal funds rate is illustrated
graphically in Figure 3. One notices immediately
the volatile behavior of the federal funds rate in
the early 1980s.
Single-Equation Estimates. We start by looking
at the results of single-equation estimates of the
federal funds rate process using the regime-switching
technique. The federal funds rate process includes
four lags of the following five variables: (i) the federal
funds rate, (ii) the log-difference of GDP, (iii) the log-
difference of the implicit GDP deflator, (iv) the log-
difference of non-borrowed reserves, and (v) the
log-difference of total reserves.25
Table 3 reports the single-equation results of
the estimation of the process for the federal funds
rate. As for M1, we find that there are clear signs of
changes in regime. We find a low-mean, low-variance
regime and a high-mean, high-variance regime. In
the low regime the mean of the federal funds rate
is estimated to be around 6.4 percent and the stan-
dard deviation to be 0.42 percent. In the high regime,
the mean is estimated to be around 8.4 percent and
the standard deviation to be 2.2 percent. Evidently,
it is the change in the variance that dominates the
change in regime in this process. Furthermore, from
the estimates of the Markov transition probabilities,
one can see that the low-mean, low-variance regime
is much more persistent than the high-mean, high-
variance regime. The probabilities imply that the
expected duration of the low-mean, low-variance
regime is close to 15 years, while the expected dura-
tion of the high-mean, high-variance regime is
exactly equal to 2 years. 
Figure 4 illustrates the estimated probabilities
of each of the two regimes. The regime with low
funds rates and a low variance of the innovations is
estimated to dominate most of the sample period.
There are two periods in which the regime with high
funds rates and high volatility takes over. The first
period is the period immediately after the first oil-
24 Hamilton (1996) provides an excellent discussion and analysis of the
federal funds daily market.
25 The results are robust to changes in the federal funds rate process.
We experimented with the inclusion of the unemployment rate, with
using the CPI rather than the GDP deflator, and with using industrial
production rather than GDP. We also experimented with alternative
lag lengths and got the same results as those reported here.
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price shock, 1973:Q3–1975:Q4. The second period
is, not surprisingly, the Volcker period, 1979:Q3–
1982:Q3. (One might also include 1982:Q4 in this
regime, but our estimates imply that the probability
of the high regime is 13.4 percent for this observa-
tion.) These results seem much more sensible than
the dating of regimes in the application using M1. 
Tests for Asymmetric Effects Using the
Federal Funds Rate. In this application we use GDP
as the measure rather than gross national product,
which is used for the analysis with the M1 data.
The results are reported in Table 4. 
In the first column we report the results for the
output equation that excludes the monetary policy
shocks; in the second column, we report the results
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For this specification, only the big negative shock
enters significantly and the other components enter
with negative coefficients, although they are insignifi-
cantly different from 0. When tested against Case 0,
we strongly reject that money is neutral. From this
perspective, there are signs of asymmetries, but the
negative point estimates on some of the shocks seem
slightly puzzling. In column 3 we impose that all
four shocks enter with identical coefficients, and,
again, the LR test strongly rejects this specification.
Thus, we proceed to test for either of the two asym-
metry hypotheses. 
First we impose the parameter restrictions for
Case 3. These restrictions have a probability value
of just above 1 percent and are thus rejected. Given
this, we proceed to Case 5, which constitutes the first
Money Supply with Changes in Regime: Federal Funds Rate Process Single-Equation Results,
1959:Q3–1995:Q3
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate Test statistic
–fft–1 1.226 ∆trt–1 –0.178 Q(1) = 0.002
(0.108) (0.044) [0.968]
–fft–2 –0.283 ∆trt–2 0.147 Q(10) = 7.612
(0.180) (0.053) [0.667]
–fft–3 0.049 ∆trt–3 –0.011 QQ(1) = 0.305
(0.163) (0.059) [0.581]
–fft–4 –0.052 –0.024 QQ(10) = 7.378
(0.093) ∆trt–4 (0.046) [0.689]
∆nbrt–1 0.145
(0.038)
∆nbrt–2 –0.113 µ0 –6.362
(0.043) (0.675)
∆nbrt–3 –0.041 ∆µ –2.031
(0.045) (0.486)
∆nbrt–4 0.047 σ0 0.418
(0.037) (0.027)
∆yt–1 –0.173 ∆σ 1.760
(0.057) (0.390)
∆yt–2 –0.053 π00 0.875
(0.055) (0.080)












NOTE: –ff is the negative of the federal funds rate; ∆nbr is the log difference of non-borrowed reserves; ∆y is the log difference of
GDP; ∆p is the log difference of the implicit GDP deflator; and ∆tr is the log difference of total reserves.
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step in testing for the menu-cost type asymmetry.
These restrictions are (marginally) rejected since the
probability value of the LR test is 3 percent. However,
even if one were willing to accept the hypothesis,
inspecting Table 4 reveals that the parameter esti-
mates imply that the small shocks are neutral,
whereas the big shocks have real effects; menu-cost
theories imply the opposite pattern. 
However, we still need to look at Case 7, which
introduces the restrictions based on the model of
Ball and Mankiw (1994). Again, we test this case
against Case 1 because it might not be nested in
Case 3 and/or Case 5.26 The likelihood of this speci-
fication is higher than the likelihood of Case 5. The
LR test implies that we cannot reject the restrictions
and the probability value is as high as 13 percent.
Furthermore, the coefficient on small negative
shocks is now significant at standard significance
levels. This result is somewhat surprising, suggesting
that the only monetary shocks that have real effects
are small negative ones (i.e., contractionary policies)
26 Given the evidence from Case 1, we also checked if only big negative
shocks have real effects. Case 7 turns out to have a much higher like-
lihood than this alternative case.
Output Equation ML Estimates: Federal Funds Rate Measure, 1948:Q1–1987:Q4 
Variable Case 0 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
Constant 0.582 0.544 0.581 0.587 0.595 0.571 0.590 0.569
(0.097) (0.114) (0.111) (0.119) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095)
∆yt–1 0.253 0.301 0.255 0.246 0.246 0.276 0.252 0.279
(0.081) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080)
∆tbrt 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆tbrt–1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆et
S+ — –0.304 –0.006 0.000 — 0.000 0.000 —
(0.295) (1.413) (0.237) (0.082) (0.102)
∆et
S– — –0.086 –0.006 0.068 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.460
(0.145) (1.413) (0.113) (0.081) (0.082) (0.102) (0.213)
∆et
B+ — –0.304 –0.006 0.000 — 0.246 — —
(0.323) (1.413) (0.237) (0.120)
∆et
B– — 0.694 –0.006 0.068 0.067 0.246 — —
(0.289) (1.413) (0.113) (0.081) (0.120)
σY 0.850 0.813 0.850 0.847 0.849 0.829 0.851 0.825
Q(1) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.044 0.048 0.064 0.000 0.002
[0.999] [0.977] [0.978] [0.834] [0.827] [0.800] [0.990] [0.968]
Q(10) 8.747 7.226 8.857 7.662 7.700 7.306 8.762 7.235
[0.556] [0.704] [0.546] [0.662] [0.658] [0.696] [0.555] [0.703]
QQ(1) 0.384 0.346 0.397 0.194 0.215 0.519 0.406 0.377
[0.536] [0.556] [0.529] [0.660] [0.643] [0.471] [0.524] [0.539]
QQ(10) 10.25 12.41 10.34 9.950 10.047 12.136 10.325 12.603
[0.419] [0.259] [0.411] [0.445] [0.436] [0.276] [0.413] [0.247]









[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.066] [0.030] [0.004] [0.127]
NOTE: See note to Table 1. 0) LR test of Case 0 vs. Case 1; 1) LR test of Case 2 vs. Case 1; 2) LR test of Case 3 vs. Case 1; 3) LR test of
Case 4 vs. Case 3; 4) LR test of Case 5 vs. Case 1; 5) LR test of Case 6 vs. Case 5; 6) LR test of Case 7 vs. Case 1.
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and that such contractions of monetary policy lower
output. Thus, the empirical evidence seems to be
in favor of the hybrid asymmetry. In conclusion,
the results indicate very strong empirical evidence
in favor of the hybrid asymmetry. In one sense, this
result provides evidence in favor of the asymmetry
hypothesis and shows that one could increase
steady-state output by lowering the variance of the
monetary policy shocks. Nevertheless, one has to
be careful with the interpretation. If the monetary
authority were to make monetary policy more pre-
dictable, firms might change their pricing policies;
this would affect the range of monetary policies
that would have real effects. Thus, it is not clear
that the policy implication mentioned above holds
in this setting. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Asymmetries in the relationship between real
aggregate activity and monetary policy is a phenom-
enon that can arise under a variety of different
assumptions about the economy. The specific version
of the asymmetry differs between competing theo-
ries, and it is often difficult to test the underlying
assumptions directly on macroeconomic data.
Furthermore, it is not clear that tests of the assump-
tions at the household or firm level necessarily carry
over to the aggregate level. Since such asymmetric
effects in principle can have strong implications
not only for the way we think about the macro-
economy, but also for the conduct of economic
policy, it thus seems important to empirically exam-
ine the evidence on these asymmetries using aggre-
gate data. 
In this paper we have focused on the possible
asymmetries in the way that different monetary
policy shocks affect real aggregate activity. The
principal aim of our investigation has been to test
indirectly for the asymmetries that may arise in
macroeconomic models with menu costs, but the
analysis may be thought of more broadly in terms
of models with imperfections in goods and labor
markets. We highlighted the possible distinctions
between different monetary policy shocks that
may arise in such models, and we compared these
with the traditional Keynesian asymmetry that has
been investigated empirically in a number of papers. 
In principle, the menu-costs models imply a
different type of asymmetric effect than the distinc-
tion between positive and negative shocks tested
for in previous papers. The most important distinc-
tion in basic menu-costs models is between big and
small shocks as distinguished either by their size
(in a non-stochastic environment) or by their vari-
ance (in a stochastic environment). However, with
steady-state inflation, there may also be a distinction
between positive and negative shocks, but the
implied asymmetry is different from the traditional
Keynesian asymmetry since the latter does not dis-
tinguish shocks by their size. 
We developed an empirical framework to dis-
tinguish between these competing theories and to
test for each of them; we applied this to U.S. postwar
data. Our results indicated that, when using M1, the
evidence is slightly mixed—since we cannot reject
either that shocks are symmetric or that negative
shocks have the same effects as positive shocks (but
both types of shocks are non-neutral). These results,
however, may be hampered by the instability of M1
demand, and we considered the same analysis using
the federal funds rate as the monetary policy meas-
ure rather than M1. In these data, which we have
more faith in, we found very strong evidence in
favor of only small negative shocks having real
effects. Thus, the U.S. data seem to indicate evidence
in favor of the asymmetry implied by menu-costs
models in environments with positive steady-state
inflation. 
It would be interesting to extend this analysis
along two lines. First, one might wish to look into
other versions of asymmetric effects. One possible
direction could be to look into how economic policy
affects output in different phases of the business
cycle. Another possibility is to look into the effects
of nominal demand shocks and their potential
asymmetric effects in stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium models. We plan to investigate these
matters in future research. 
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DATA DESCRIPTION
All variables studied in this paper are sampled at the quarterly frequency and were de-seasonalized
from the source. The first set of data was kindly supplied by James Peery Cover and is described in detail in
Cover (1992). The sample period covers 1948:Q1–1987:Q4. The variables used here are defined as follows:
m1 = the logarithm of M1 
y = the logarithm of GDP in constant prices 
b = the logarithm of the monetary base 
u = the unemployment rate 
fs = the logarithm of the federal government’s budget surplus 
tbr = the T-bill rate 
The second set of data corresponds to the data set studied in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996).
These data were obtained from the Datastream database. The sample period covers 1959:Q3–1995:Q3.
The variables used here are defined as follows: 
–ff = the negative of the federal funds rate 
y = the logarithm of GDP in constant prices 
nbr = the logarithm of the sum of non-borrowed reserves and extended credit 
py = the logarithm of the implicit GDP deflator 
trs = the logarithm of total reserves 
tbr = the T-bill rate 
THE FILTER
It is assumed that one of the variables included in the filter is governed by a scalar state variable. The other
variable(s) is (are) not allowed to switch and is (are) de-meaned. The filter involves the following five steps. 
Step 1. Let y and x be the variables that are observed, and let s be the unobserved state variable.
Calculate the density of the m past states and the current state conditional on the information included
in yt–1, xt–1 and all past values of y and x: 
(A.1)
where p(st|st–1) is the transition probability matrix of the states that are assumed to follow a Markov process.
As in all subsequent steps, the second term on the right-hand side is known from the preceding step of the
filter. In the present case the probability on the left-hand side of equation (A.1) is known from the input to
the filter, which in turn represents the result of the iteration at date t–1 (from step 5 described below). 
Initial values for the parameters and the initial conditions for the Markov process are required to start
the filter. The unconditional distribution, p(sm,sm–1,,s0), has been chosen for the first observation. 
Step 2. Calculate the joint conditional density of yt and (st,st–1,,st–m), 
(A.2)
where we assume that 
py s s s y y y x x x
s
su
ttt t mt t t t
t
ts t























py s s s y y y x x x
pys s y y x x ps s y y x x
ttt t mt t t t
t tt m t t tt m t t
( , , ,, , ,, , , ,, )
( ,, , ,, , ,, ) ( ,, ,, , ,, ),
−− −− − −
−− − −− − =
1 12 012 0
10 10 10 10
ps s s y y y x x x
ps s ps s s y y y x x x
tt t mt t t t
tt t t t m t t t t
( , ,, , ,, , , ,, )
( ) ( , ,, , ,, , , ,, ),
−− −− − −
−− − − − − − − =
1 12 012 0
1 1 2 12 012 0




It should be noted that p(yt|st,,st–m,yt–1,,y0,xt–1,,x0) involves (st,,st–m), which is a vector that can take on
2
m+1 values. 
Step 3. Marginalize the previous joint densities with respect to the states, which give the conditional
density from which the (conditional) likelihood function is calculated: 
(A.3)
Step 4. Combining the results from steps 2 and 3, calculate the joint density of the state conditional
on the observed current and past realizations of y: 
(A.4)
Step 5. The desired output is then obtained from
(A.5)
The output of step 5 is used as an input to the filter in the next iteration. Estimates of the parameters
are calculated by maximizing the sample likelihood, which can be calculated from step 3. 
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